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后疫情时代下，越来越多的零售商采取双渠道模式，中小企业在进行双渠道运营时面临更多的发展困境与决策风险，同时消费者需求的复苏也使得企业愈发资金紧张，双渠道市场环境和资金约束等挑战促使这些企业更趋向于风险厌恶。因此，探究资金约束条件下考虑全成员风险厌恶的定价以及融资决策成为亟待解决的问题。本文构建了一个由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链，其中零售商通过线上、线下两种渠道销售产品，制造商存在资金约束且双方均风险厌恶，采用Stackelberg博弈模型，旨在研究零售商双渠道下供应链的最优价格决策以及最优融资决策。研究表明：在零售商双渠道下，内部融资能够有效降低生产成本和销售价格，缓解牛鞭效应，对消费者友好。此外，供应链成员的风险厌恶对融资方式的选择具有重要影响。随着零售商的风险厌恶水平提高，制造商更倾向于外部融资，而零售商更倾向于内部融资，二者在融资方式选择上存在一定的矛盾，但收益共享契约能够有效解决分歧，提高供应链各成员的效用。
Abstract：In the post-pandemic era, more and more retailers have adopted a dual-channel model. Small and medium-sized enterprises, when conducting the dual-channel operation, face more development dilemmas and decision risks. Meantime, the recovery of consumer demand also makes enterprises increasingly cashstrapped. Challenges such as the dual-channel market environment and financial constraints force these enterprises to become more risk averse. Therefore, an urgent issue to be resolved is to explore the pricing and financing decision that consider all-member risk aversion under financial constraints. In this paper, a secondary supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is constructed, where the retailer sells products through both online and offline channels, and the manufacturer is capital constrained and both parties are risk averse. The Stackelberg leadership model is adopted to investigate the optimal pricing decision and the optimal financing decision for the dual channel retailer in the supply chain. Research shows that internal financing can effectively reduce production costs and sales prices for dual channel retailers, mitigating the bullwhip effect and being consumer friendly. In addition, the risk aversion of supply chain members has an important impact on the choice of financing method. As the level of risk aversion in the retailers increases,the manufacturers prefer external financing while the retailers prefer internal financing. There are certain contradictions in the choice of financing methods between the two while the revenue sharing contracts can effectively resolve the differences and improve the utility of each member in the supply chain.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202304.0203
中图分类号:F275;F274
引用信息:
[1]赵达,龚俊强.制造商资金约束下全成员风险厌恶零售商双渠道供应链定价与融资决策研究[J].海南大学学报(人文社会科学版),2025,43(05):89-100.DOI:10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202304.0203.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金地区项目（71861009）; 海南省自然科学基金面上项目（722RC628）
2024-01-05
2024-01-05
2024-01-05