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作为反垄断救济措施的数字平台互操作义务，是解决当前数字平台封禁行为的重要方式，既能维持现有符合市场特征的市场结构，又能将数字平台内部的网络效应外部化，允许市场竞争者公平共享网络效应产生的效率。通过降低市场进入壁垒恢复市场的有效竞争，避免用户、数据等价值要素聚集于少数数字平台。不论是作为反垄断事前监管措施，还是作为反垄断事后救济措施，数字平台互操作义务都有较好的适用基础和空间。结合我国目前肯定性调整方法规定不足的现实情况，数字平台互操作义务可能适用的情形也比较清晰，主要是针对数字平台既有反竞争性的互操作安排。实施时应当明确以基线标准作为实施的限度，严格秉持依法、审慎、积极和协同的理念。以公平原则、比例原则为义务设计的基本原则，对互操作义务的范围、标准以及监管等各方面内容予以科学设定。
Abstract：The interoperability obligation for the digital platform, as an anti-monopoly remedy, is an important and useful means to address the current exclusionary practices of digital platforms. It preserves the market structure that aligns with market characteristics while externalizing the network effects within digital platforms, allowing market competitors to fairly share the efficiencies produced by network effects. By reducing market entry barriers, it restores effective competition and prevents the aggregation of users, data, and other valuable assets to few digital platforms. No matter whether it functions as an ex-ante regulation measure or ex-post remedy in the anti-monopoly enforcement, the interoperability obligation for the digital platform has the better foundation and space for application. In view of insufficient provisions on affirmative remedies in the current Chinese anti-monopoly law, the scenarios where the interoperability obligation for the digital platform may apply are relatively clear, mainly targeting the existing anti-competitive arrangements of interoperability among the digital platforms. Its implementation should clarify the baseline standard as the limit, and strictly adhere to the ideas of legality, prudence, proactiveness, and collaboration. Fairness and proportionality should be followed as the basic principles to design the obligation so as to scientifically set the scope, standard, and supervision of interoperability obligation.
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(1)如微播视界、字节跳动诉腾讯等滥用市场支配地位案（（2021）京73民初189号），以及张正鑫诉腾讯滥用市场支配地位案（（2021）京73民初190号）等。
(2)如工业和信息化部信息通信管理局局长赵志国在“推进制造强国网络强国建设助力全面建成小康社会”有关情况发布会上表示：“互联互通是互联网行业高质量发展的必然选择。让用户畅通安全地使用互联网，也是互联网行业正在努力的方向。同时也要求企业能够按照整改要求，务实推进即时通信屏蔽网址链接等不同类型的问题，能够分步骤、分阶段得到解决。”
(1)该定义参考电气与电子工程师协会（IEEE）在《软件工程术语标准词汇表》的表述，原文为“The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged”。
(2)目前一般将个人数据分为三类：数据主体自愿提供的自愿数据（Volunteered Data）、数据主体在网络活动中被个人信息处理者观测到的观测数据（Observed Data），以及个人信息处理者经过对前两类数据分析、处理后得到的推断数据（Inferred Data）。
(1)欧盟第29条数据保护工作组（Article 29 Data Protection Working Party）在《数据可携权指南》中提到，数据可携性“通用、结构化和机器可读”的数据转移格式旨在促进并期望能实现互操作。
(2)七层网络模型也称开放系统互联模型（Open System Interconnection,OSI），是国际标准化组织（ISO）制定用于计算机或通信系统间互联的标准体系。
(3) United States v.Terminal Railroad Ass'n,224 U.S.383 (1912）.
(1) United States v.American Tel.and Tel.Co.,552 F.Supp.131(D.D.C.1983）.
(2) Plaintiff v.Facebook,Inc.,Defendant,1:20-cv-03590-JEB.
(3)国市监行指反垄[2021]1号。
(4) U.S.and Plaintiff States v.Google LLC,Case 1:20-cv-03010.
(5)“长尾”查询（“Long-Tail”Queries）：指搜索关键词不太常见的搜索。
(6)“新鲜”查询（“Fresh”Queries）：指搜索关键词较新的搜索。
(1) U.S.v.Google Inc.and ITA Software,Inc.,Case 1:11-cv-00688-RLW.
(1) Case M.8124-Microsoft/Linked In.
(2) Federal Trade Commission,Plaintiff v.Facebook,Inc.,Defendant,1:20-cv-03590-JEB.
(3) Aspen Skiing Co.v.Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,472 U.S.585(1985）.
(4) Verizon Communications v.Law Offices of Curtis V.Trinko,LLP,540 U.S.398.
(1)不过Aspen Skiing案的判决书原文中并没有对共同投资进行说明，Hovenkamp教授也指出法院没有引用任何当事人关于基于承诺进行特定重大投资的意见。
(2) People Browsr,Inc.v.Twitter,Inc.,No.C-12-6120 EMC(N.D.Cal.Mar.6,2013）.
(3)广告服务器（Ad Server）：指将广告投放到指定网站的服务器。作用包括：（1）识别、标记访问媒体的用户以帮助媒体管理广告位并提高产出；（2）管理媒体通过广告交易平台（Ad Exchange）等间接渠道的广告销售；（3）将广告通过媒体直接或间接的销售渠道正确投放。
(4)媒体（Publisher）：指网站、应用程序等提供广告位的载体。
(5)用户识别码（User ID）：指广告服务器代表或经媒体授权后，通过网页浏览器、移动应用设备提取信息，识别用户并分配独立的识别码。用户识别码可以帮助媒体、广告交易平台以及广告主了解用户的身份、特征等信息，例如可以知道用户浏览到类似广告的时长、次数并追踪用户后续是否有点击、购买等操作。
(1)广告网络（Ad Network）：代表媒体与广告主商价、交易的平台。
(2) Fed.Trade Comm'n v.Facebook,Inc.,Civil Action No.20-3590(JEB)(D.D.C.Jun.28,2021）.
(3) Lorain Journal v.United States,342 U.S.143,72 S.Ct.181,96 L.Ed.162(1951）.
(1) Epic Games,Inc.v.Apple Inc.,4:20-cv-05640-YGR(N.D.Cal.Sep.10,2021）.
(2) Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v.Commission,Joined Cases C-241/91 P&C-242/91 P,1995 E.C.R.I-743,[1995]4 C.M.L.R.718.
(3) IMS Health Gmb H&Co.OHG v.NDC Health Gmb H&Co.KG.,Case C-418/01.
(1)特别部分（Besonderer Teil）位于德国《反限制竞争法》第十次修正案（草案）文本的第七部分中。
(1)账户服务和支付服务提供商（Primarily Account Servicing Payment Service Providers）：主要是银行、电子货币机构等。
(2)共谋稳定的基础条件包括：（1）具有协调动机；（2）存在反复作用或高频互动（即市场交互性）；（3）具有较高市场透明度。
(1)如在《信息安全技术个人信息安全工程指南》中，就有个人信息安全工程（Information Security Engineering）的概念，指将个人信息保护关注点整合到系统和软件生命周期过程的工程实践中。
(2) United States v.Grinnell Corp.,384 U.S.563,86 S.Ct.1698(1966）.
(1)例如Fed.Trade Comm'n v.Qualcomm Inc.案（Fed.Trade Comm'n v.Qualcomm Inc.,411 F.Supp.3d 658(N.D.Cal.2019））。
(2)国市监处罚[2021]74号。
(3) New York v.Microsoft Corp.,224 F.Supp.2d 76(D.D.C.2002）.
(4)原告诉请法院要求Microsoft在所有Windows操作系统上分装与原告产品相兼容的JAVA虚拟机（Sun-Compliant JVM）。
(1)如美国在《1995年录音制品数字表演权法案》中，就对录音制品排他性授权的权利范围作出限制。
(2)如数据主体在行使欧盟《通用数据保护条例》框架下的数据可携权时，可以要求被请求的数据以结构化的、通用的和机器可读的格式提供。仅仅是基础层面或结构层面的互操作要求，即能保证接收数据的数据控制者能有效使用数据。
(1)目前开发数字平台互操作标准的第三方独立组织有很多，例如麻省理工的GOBO项目以及Mastodon、Diaspora等。其中不乏被万维网联盟组织（W3C）推荐的标准Activity Pub，但普及应用率很低而且还受到广泛的批评和争议。
(2) H.R.3849-ACCESS Act of 2021.
(1)如在《国务院办公厅关于促进平台经济规范健康发展的指导意见》中，就有“尊重消费者选择权，确保跨平台互联互通和互操作”的表述。
基本信息:
DOI：10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202205.0058
中图分类号:D922.294
引用信息:
[1]时建中,吴宗泽.作为反垄断救济措施的数字平台互操作义务[J].海南大学学报(人文社会科学版),2024,42(01):108-125.DOI:10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202205.0058.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目（18AFX019）
2022-05-06
2022
2022-12-12
2023-03-23
2023
1
2022-12-20
2022-12-20
2022-12-20