海南大学学报(社会科学版)

《“十四五”规划和远景目标》提出“深化国有企业混合所有制改革”的命题，那么作为混合所有制改革主要形式的非国有资本参股，能够提高不同性质股权的协同效应吗？运用案例研究法，针对混改企业中非国有股东的机会主义行为的具体情形，依据舞弊三角理论，分析其自利行为产生的动因。对SW公司股权结构的分析结果显示：非国有股东持股比例跨越了股权结构拐点，触发其引进关系股东，形成“一致行动人”，将控股股东“一股独大”的股权结构变为平衡股权结构，导致非国有股东及“一致行动人”获得“内部管理人”控制权，从而为其实现关联交易、掏空或侵占等私利行为提供便利。从股权结构特征视角，阐述了国企混改中非国有股东进行合谋控制权投机的机理，为相关部门进行有效监管提供经验支撑。

According to The Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan(2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, a proposition is to“deepen the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises”. Can the participation of non-state capitals as the main form of mixed ownership reform improve the synergistic effects of different types of equity? In terms of the specific situations of opportunistic behaviors of non-state-owned shareholders in the enterprises of mixed ownership reform, the case study method is used to analyze the causes of their self-interest behaviors within the fraud triangle theory. As shown in the analyses of the equity structure of SW company, the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders crosses the inflection point of equity structure. This has triggered the introduction of related shareholders and then formed the“concerted action person”. Furthermore, the equity structure of the controlling shareholders is changed from“one share dominance”to the balanced equity structure, which enables the non-state-owned shareholders and“concerted action person”to obtain the control right of the“internal manager”. Finally, there exist the opportunities that facilitate the realization of related party transactions, tunneling or embezzlement and other private interests. Considering the characteristics of equity structure, this paper expounds the mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders' collusion for control right and their speculation in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, which provides the empirical support for relevant departments to carry out the effective supervision.